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We study the relation between formal incentives and social exchange in organizations where 
employees work for several managers and reciprocate a manager’s attention with higher 
effort. To this end we develop a common agency model with two-sided moral hazard. We 
show that when effort is contractible but attention is not, the first-best can be achieved 
through granting autonomy of effort choice to employees and giving bonus pay to both 
managers and employees. When neither effort nor attention are contractible, an ‘attention 
race’ arises, as each manager tries to sway the employee’s effort his way. While this may 
result in too much social exchange, the attention race may also be a blessing because it 
alleviates managers’ moral-hazard problem in attention provision. Lastly, we derive the 
implications of these contract imperfections for optimal organizational design. 
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Managers in organizations often use common human resources. For example,
they share secretary services, the IT unit, and the personnel department.
People who provide these supporting roles typically face ﬁnancial incentives,
be they explicit or implicit. However, most of us have the experience that
social interaction to establish a good ‘working relation’ really helps to get
your computer ﬁx e di nt i m e ,t os p e e du pf o r m a l i t i e si nl a s t - m i n u t eh i r i n g ,o r
to crucially improve the lay-out of your document in Powerpoint. Although
(obviously) we are nice people, niceness is sometimes also used strategically
to trigger reciprocal feelings in others to get things done.
Such social exchange in organizations has been studied extensively in
the organizational sociology and management literature, where worker reci-
procity in response to managerial or organizational support is a common
theme (see, e.g., Baron and Kreps 1999, chapter 5). The economic litera-
ture on manager-subordinate reciprocity has so far mainly focussed on how
generous ﬁnancial compensation is interpreted as ‘kindness’ by the employer,
triggering eﬀort and loyalty in the employment relation (Akerlof 1982, Fehr
and Gächter 2000). Relatively little has been written in economics about
social interactions between managers and workers in ﬁrms.
This paper develops an economic model of social exchange within ﬁrms.
Our aim is to get more insight into the relation between workers’ formal
employment contract (the wage, ﬁnancial incentives) and social interaction
between managers and workers at the workplace. Further, we investigate
the consequences of social interaction and workers’ reciprocity for optimal
organizational design.
We focus on a situation where multiple principals compete for the eﬀort
of an agent with reciprocal feelings. The game consists of three stages. In
the ﬁrst stage, the principals (or the superior of the principals) design(s)
a contract that speciﬁes the relationship between each principal and the
agent. In addition, in this ﬁr s ts t a g et h ep r i n c i p a l sd e c i d eo nw h e t h e ra n d ,
if so, with how many of them to share an agent. For example, we may
think of professors (or the department chair) deciding on with how many to
share one secretary, how eﬀort by this secretary is rewarded ﬁnancially, and
possibly how they treat the secretary while on the job (buying her favorite
ﬂowers on secretary’s day). In the second stage, each principal decides on
his ‘attention level’ for the agent, taking into account the contract and that
in the third stage the agent responds positively to attention by providing
more eﬀort for him. In the third stage, the agent decides on her eﬀort level
for each of the principals, taking account of her contract and the attention
1provided by the principals in the second stage.
In the ﬁrst-best — eﬀort and attention are contractible — the marginal
beneﬁts from eﬀort for each principal equal the marginal costs of eﬀort
for the agent minus a reciprocity discount. Further, when designing the
contract, the principals trade oﬀ the costs of giving attention against the
wage compensation that is necessary to attract or retain the agent. In the
optimum, the marginal cost of giving attention of each principal equal the
marginal utility that the agent derives from attention. Lastly, the optimal
number of principals that share an agent equates the average costs of eﬀort
to the marginal costs of eﬀort.
Obviously, in many cases, eﬀort and bilateral social interaction cannot
be contracted upon, for instance because enforcement costs are high (eﬀort)
or because the outcomes cannot be veriﬁed by a third party (attention). We
show that when attention by principals cannot be contracted, but the agent’s
eﬀort is contractible, the ﬁrst-best outcome can still be achieved by granting
autonomy of eﬀort choice to the agent and providing bonus pay to both the
principals and the agent. When the agent is granted suﬃcient room for
manoeuvre in the post-contractual phase, attention of each principal can be
inferred from the eﬀort of the agent for each of them. Hence, in the ﬁrst stage
of the game, the principals can contract to punish those among them for
which eﬀort is too low, implicitly punishing ‘bad management’. By contrast,
when the agent’s eﬀort for each principal is speciﬁed in a forcing contract,
in the second stage principals have no incentive to provide a positive level
of attention. This moral-hazard problem is anticipated in the ﬁrst stage
by the agent: she expects little attention from the principals and therefore
demands a high wage. We thus identify a new beneﬁt of granting autonomy
to workers: it enables the organization to measure and reward managers’
performance.
A similar moral-hazard problem in attention provision exists when nei-
ther eﬀort nor attention are contractible. However, due to an externality
problem, we show that an ‘attention race’ among the principals arises, which
mitigates or even reverses the underprovision of attention. The reason for
the attention race is that in a non-cooperative setting each principal has an
incentive to sway the agent’s eﬀort his way. This incentive is stronger for a
larger number of principals and the more reciprocal the agent is.
Whether the attention race on balance is good or bad for the ﬁrm de-
pends on the preferences of the agent for attention. If the agent cares much
for attention, then the attention race is beneﬁcial for the ﬁrm, for it cre-
ates a positive working environment that is much appreciated by the agent.
Without the attention race, the principals’ inability to commit to attention
2would be very costly. The reverse happens when the agent puts a low value
on attention. In that case the attention race is costly to the ﬁrm, for it
has little eﬀect on the participation constraint of the agent, while it absorbs
precious managerial resources. Consequently, the ﬁrm may want to limit
the number of principals that share an agent.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section
provides some further empirical motivation and brieﬂy discusses related lit-
erature. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 and 5 examine the cases
of complete contracts and incomplete contracts, respectively. Section 6 con-
cludes.
2 Empirical motivation and related literature
While the economic analysis of workers’ reciprocity has so far been mainly
conﬁned to the role of the formal employment relation (the wage contract)
in triggering reciprocity and loyalty, in other disciplines there is scepti-
cism towards such overemphasis on pay as the motivator (see e.g. Pfeﬀer
1998).1 The observation that social exchange provides non-ﬁnancial incen-
tives within organizations has for long been recognized in the management
literature and in organizational sociology. Following a seminal paper in this
ﬁeld by Gouldner (1960) — who argues that reciprocity is needed for the
stability of social systems, including the ﬁrm —, Blau (1964) distinguishes
two types of exchange in organizations: economic and social. Economic
exchange typically is deﬁned as formal ‘in-role’ behavior (the wage and con-
tracted eﬀort in our model). Social exchange includes various ‘extra-role’
activities such as giving attention in our model or providing non-speciﬁed
eﬀort for a particular manager. According to Blau (1964, p. 94) “only social
exchange tends to engender feelings of personal obligations, gratitude, and
trust; purely economic exchange as such does not”.
Empirical research provides substantial support for a performance en-
hancing eﬀect of social exchange between managers and workers. For ex-
1Reciprocity is only recently gaining prominence in organizational and managerial eco-
nomics. For example, in Prendergast’s (1999) review of incentive provision in ﬁrms, the
word reciprocity is not mentioned once. In traditional economic models, a higher wage
only induces more eﬀort if the wage is, in some or another way, linked to the worker’s eﬀort.
By contrast, as argued by Akerlof (1982), when workers are reciprocal a more generous
wage induces additional eﬀorts, for a worker increases his utility by reciprocating such a
gift. Following Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993), numerous laboratory studies have
provided support for this monetary gift-exchange relation (see Fehr and Gächter 2000 for
a review). The results of recent ﬁeld experiments are, however, less encouraging (Gneezy
and List 2006, List 2006, Kube et al. 2006, Al-Ubaydli et al. 2007).
3ample, using data from surveys among managers and workers, many studies
have found that a higher quality of so-called ‘leader-member exchange rela-
tionships’ (LMX) and ‘perceived supervisor support’ (PSS) are associated
with better performance of the worker, both in required duties as well as in
those beyond the formal employment contract (see e.g. Settoon et al. 1996,
Wayne et al. 1997, Uhl-Bien and Maslyn 2003, Dabos and Rousseau 2004,
and Shanock and Eisenberger 2006).2 Nagin et al. (2002) study cheating
in call centers and ﬁnd that employees who feel that they are treated well
by their employer cheat less and are less responsive to changes in monitor-
ing by the employer. Their data also show that many employees (70% in
their sample) have the impression that the company cares about their per-
sonal well-being. In line with this, US survey evidence indicates that many
managers are willing to listen to personal problems of their subordinates.3
Social exchange has also been shown to aﬀect workers’ wage compensation.
A famous example is given by Gittell (2003) who evaluates pay conditions at
Southwest Airlines and ﬁnds that the positive corporate culture and strong
relational contracts make employees willing to accept a lower wage than
their industry counterparts. Examples from other industries are provided in
Pfeﬀer (1998) and Borzaga and Depedri (2005) among others.
Our model incorporates these ﬁndings on how social exchange matters
for productivity and wage cost in the following two ways. First, social ex-
change relaxes the participation constraint of the workers: attention by their
superiors makes workers feel good, which makes them willing to work for a
lower wage. Second, social exchange with a superior reduces the worker’s
costs of eﬀort for that superior at the margin. Hence, a manager’s attention
induces the employee to work harder for a given wage schedule.
Our paper builds on the common agency literature with moral hazard,
initiated by Bernheim and Whinston (1985, 1986).4 The ‘attention race’
among principals that we identify in Section 5 echoes Bernheim and Whin-
ston’s (1986) result that ineﬃciencies may arise from coordination problems
2A closely related and partially overlapping body of research examines the eﬀects of
‘perceived organizational support’ (POS), that is, an employee’s belief about how much
the organization as a whole provides support to or cares about the worker. Generally,
empirical studies ﬁnd strong eﬀects of POS on commitment to the organization (loyalty,
turnover), but — in contrast to LMX and PSS — only weak eﬀects on performance (see
Pazy and Ganzach 2006 and the references therein).
33 4 %o fw o r k e r ss t a t et h a tt h e i rb o s si s“ v e r ym u c h ”w i l l i n gt ol i s t e nt ot h e i rp e r s o n a l
problems. Only 11% report that their boss is not willing to listen at all. See the Wisconsin
Longitudinal Study, 2002-2003 Wave, http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/wlsresearch/.
4There is also a large literature on common agency with adverse selection, see Laﬀont
and Martimort (1997) and Martimort (2006) for surveys.
4between principals when coordination among principals would not achieve
the ﬁrst-best.5 Our results on the optimal number of principals that share
an agent are close in spirit to Bernheim and Whinston (1985). They an-
alyze manufacturer’s incentives to share a marketing agency, which serves
as a facilitating device for product market collusion among manufacturers
(see also Gal-Or 1991 and Martimort 1996, among others). An important
diﬀerence between our set-up and the standard common-agency model is
that principals in our model have two instruments at their disposal to mo-
tivate the agent: contracts and attention. Another distinguishing feature
of our analysis is that we allow for two-sided moral hazard in the relation
between the agent and the principals: after contracts have been signed, both
the agent and the principals take actions that are imperfectly contractible.
One of the results emanating from this is that the attention race among
principals may be a blessing in disguise, for it may resolve a moral hazard
problem on the side of the principals. Lastly, we contribute to the existing
literature on common agency by focusing on reciprocity in organizations.
Our paper is just one piece in a growing body of literature on behavioral
personnel economics that stresses the importance of feelings in the work-
place. Classic examples are the papers by Rotemberg (1994) on altruism
among workers and Rotemberg and Saloner (1993) on the role of emphatic
managers in alleviating the hold-up problem. More recently, Rob and Zem-
sky (2002) and Corneo and Rob (2003) have studied incentive provision
when workers derive direct utility from cooperative tasks, while Akerlof and
Kranton (2005) have examined the implications of social identity at work.
Delfgaauw and Dur (2006) and Francois (2006) study incentives and sort-
ing issues when workers diﬀer in intrinsic motivation. In addition, there
is a growing literature that studies manager-subordinate interaction in the
post-hiring phase. For example, Benabou and Tirole (2003) and Ellingsen
and Johannesson (2006) discuss how task assignment and pay structure may
reveal the manager’s private judgement of the worker’s ability or his beliefs
about the abilities of workers in general. These, in turn, aﬀect the worker’s
motivation. Lastly, a number of recent studies have considered the eﬀect
of workers’ concerns about their payoﬀ relative to that of their superior on
workers’ eﬀort and on contract design, see Englmaier and Wambach (2005),
Fehr et al. (2006), and Dur and Glazer (2006).
5See Dixit (1997) for an interesting analysis of common agency problems and incen-
tive provision in public organizations. Tirole (1988) and Holmstrom (1999) also discuss
common agency problems within organizations. Tangentially, our paper also relates to
Milgrom (1988), Milgrom and Roberts (1988), Fairburn and Malcomson (2001), and In-
derst et al. (2005) who study post-hiring inﬂuence activities by workers.
53 The model
Our model revolves around homogenous principals, indexed by i, whose pay-
oﬀs depend on the services provided for them by one or more homogenous
agents. Agents are available in unlimited supply, but must be compensated
for foregoing their outside option (U>0) and for the (net) disutility from
working. A principal can hire his own agent, but he can also decide to share
an agent with other principals (that is, to hire a common agent together
with other principals).6 Since principals are homogenous, they have iden-
tical preferences over the number of principals to share an agent with; this
number is denoted by n.7 Each group of n principals collectively oﬀers a
contract to an agent which speciﬁes the agent’s wage compensation, w,a s
well as the way in which wage costs are shared among the principals. If the
agent’s eﬀort and/or the principals’ attention are contractible, the contract
can also contain other provisions, e.g. bonus pay to the agent depending
on her eﬀort or reductions in a principal’s contribution to the wage costs
depending on the attention provided. After signing the contract, each prin-
cipal i independently chooses the level of attention he gives to the agent,
w h i c hw ed e n o t eb yai. Subsequently, the agent chooses the level of eﬀort she
exerts for each of the principals involved in the contract; eﬀort for principal
i is denoted by ei.
The payoﬀ of principal i is described by
πi = Q(ei) − H(ai) − si, (1)
where Q(ei) is a strictly concave and increasing function reﬂecting the value
for the principal of the agent’s eﬀort for him, H(ai) is a strictly convex and
increasing function for ai ≥ 0 representing the principal’s costs of giving
attention, and si is the contribution of principal i to the agent’s wage com-
pensation, w.8 The function Q(ei) satisﬁes the Inada conditions and the
function H(ai) satisﬁes H(0) = Ha(0) = 0, where (throughout the paper)
subscripts of functions denote partial derivatives. The budget constraint for
the set of n principals is
R n
0 si = w.
6None of the results change when a superior of the principals makes these decisions,
provided that the superior’s and joint principals’ interests are the same.
7We will abstract from the problem — which may be relevant in small organizations
— that not all of the existing principals may ﬁnd suﬃciently many other principals to
optimally share an agent with. Also, for ease of exposition and without signiﬁcant loss of
generality, when determining the optimal level of n w et r e a ti ta sac o n t i n u o u sv a r i a b l e .
8It should be noted that, since a prinicpal’s ‘output’ Q is deterministic and a monotone
function of the agent’s eﬀort for him, contractibility of the principal’s output and con-
tractibility of the agent’s eﬀort are equivalent in our model.
6The agent’s payoﬀ U is:




0 F(ei,a i). (2)
Since the wage enters linearly in the payoﬀ function, the agent is risk-neutral
in income. The function C represents the agent’s cost of eﬀort and is strictly
convex and increasing in the total eﬀort exerted for all principals. It satisﬁes
C(0) = 0 and Ce(0) = 0. The function F(ei,a i) describes both the value of
attention to the agent and her reciprocity. In line with the empirical obser-
vations described in the previous section, we make the following assumptions
about the properties of this function. First, we assume that Fai > 0;t h a ti s ,
the agent enjoys attention. Second, we assume that Fei(ei,0) = 0 and that
Feiai(ei,a i) > 0. These assumptions imply that — holding C constant — the
agent gains utility from exerting eﬀort for a principal who has given atten-
tion to her (Fei > 0 when ai > 0). In other words: reciprocating a principal’s
attention with eﬀort yields immediate utility to the worker.9 The reverse
is also true: If a principal has been unkind (ai < 0), then Fei < 0,a n ds o
there is an additional utility loss from exerting eﬀort for that principal, over
and above the cost of eﬀort described by the function C. Such emotional
and expressive reactions that stem from the evolution of the human brain
are often stressed in psychology where, in general, reciprocity is not con-
sidered a cognitive process (see Frank 1988).10 Instead, people cannot help
responding to the impulse of reciprocating a gift.11 Note that, together, the
9The characteristics of the F function can be traced back to social exchange theory in
management science. The assumption that Fa > 0 links to the discussion on the resources
of exchange in organizations (Foa and Foa 1980), in which exchange of less concrete
resources provides symbolic utility to the receiver, also when there is no reciprocation.
The assumption that Fe > 0 when a>0 closely relates to Gouldner’s (1960) notion of
reciprocity as interdependent exchanges, as the payoﬀs for the principals and the agent
are based on a combination of actors’ eﬀorts. In this tradition, reciprocal exchange is one
in which there is no explicit bargaining; rather, the actions of one actor are contingent on
the actions of the other agent (Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005 p. 876).
10To illustrate this, a famous (and true) story of how reciprocal emotions can be used
is that of car salesman Joe Gerard, known as “the greatest car salesman”. His secret was
to write each of his 13,000 former customers a card every month with only the words “I
like you” on it.
11We should stress, however, that our approach need not conﬂict with other approaches
to reciprocity. For instance, the function F(ei,a i) can also represent an agent’s reciprocal
behavior out of inequity aversion (as in Fehr and Schmidt 1999 and Bolton and Ockenfels
2000, among others), provided that the welfare of the principal and of the agent are not
too far apart and that the welfare comparison includes the beneﬁts and costs of attention.
Alternatively, in a model with heterogenous principals, attention may signal a principal’s
innate kindness, which may trigger reciprocal responses by the agent, as in Levine (1998)
and Arbak and Kranich (2005).
7functions C and F constitute a generalized cost of eﬀort function. Lastly,
we assume that Faa < 0 and Fee < 0, so as to rule out corner solutions
where inﬁnite or zero attention is optimal or where the agent exerts eﬀort
for only one of the principals. Throughout the paper, the third derivatives
of all functions are assumed to be negligibly small.





0 F(ei,a i) ≥ U. (3)
The timing of the game is as follows. In stage one, the principals coop-
eratively decide on the number of principals that share one agent and on the
content of the contract. The agent decides whether to accept or reject the
contract. Once the organizational structure and the contract are in place,
in stage two each principal independently chooses the level of attention he
gives to the agent. In stage three the agent chooses her eﬀort level for each
principal.
4 Complete contracts
We start by considering the case of complete contracts. The ﬁrst-best con-
tract stipulates the levels of eﬀort, attention, the number of principals that
share an agent, the agent’s wage, and the way wage costs are shared by the
principals. Our results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In the ﬁrst-best:
1. the marginal beneﬁtf r o me ﬀort for each principal equals the marginal
cost of eﬀort for the agent minus a reciprocity discount: Qe(ei)=
Ce(
R n
0 ei) − Fe(ei,a i),
2. the marginal cost of attention for each principal equals the marginal
beneﬁt of attention for the agent: Ha(ai)=Fa(ei,a i),
3. the optimal number of principals that share one agent equates the aver-










The proof is given in the appendix. Clearly, from the ﬁrst part of the
proposition it follows that if the optimal level of attention is positive, then
for a given number of principals the ﬁrst-best contract speciﬁes an eﬀort level
ei that is higher than the conventional level which ignores reciprocity (i.e.,
8ignores the term Fe). The intuition is that the principals’ attention reduces
the agent’s marginal cost of eﬀort because she feels the need to reciprocate.
This reduction in marginal cost raises the optimal level of eﬀort the agent
exerts for each principal.
The second part of the proposition describes the optimal levels of atten-
tion. This involves a trade-oﬀ between the costs of giving attention for the
principals and the beneﬁt from attention for the agent, where the optimal
level equates the marginal cost and marginal beneﬁt. By our assumptions
on the ﬁrst and second derivatives, ﬁrst-best attention is strictly positive.
Obviously, the beneﬁts from attention ultimately accrue to the principals,
as the agent’s wage compensation is such that her participation constraint
binds.
The third part of the proposition shows that the optimal number of
principals that share one agent equates the agent’s average cost of eﬀort to
the agent’s marginal cost of eﬀort. This makes sense: sharing an agent with
more principals reduces each principal’s contribution to the ﬁxed cost of
the agent (the agent’s compensation for foregoing her outside option utility
U), but increases the agent’s compensation for eﬀort costs because these
a r ec o n v e x . A su s u a l ,t h el o w e s tc o s tp e ru n i to fe ﬀort is attained when
marginal cost equal average cost.
Note that the agent’s reciprocity has no direct eﬀect on the optimal
number of principals. This follows from the separability of each principal’s
attention in the agent’s utility function, implying that the rents from giv-
ing attention are constant per principal.12 However, the optimal number
of principals sharing an agent is indirectly aﬀected by reciprocity through
its eﬀect on the optimal level of eﬀort. This is described in the following
corollary.
Corollary 1 In the ﬁrst-best, the agent’s reciprocity makes it optimal for
the principals to commit to give attention to the agent, which increases op-
timal eﬀort for each principal and, therefore, reduces the optimal number of
principals that share one agent.
The proof is in the appendix. The intuition is as follows. As we have seen,
when the agent is reciprocal, principals optimally give attention, which raises
the agent’s eﬀort for each of them. Consequently, the marginal cost of eﬀort
(Ce) increase and so sharing an agent with more principals becomes more
12An alternative assumption would be that the agent’s utility from a principal’s atten-
tion decreases with total attention received from all principals, i.e. Fai
U n
0 ai < 0.C l e a r l y ,
this modiﬁcation would reduce the optimal number of principals who share one agent.
9costly. The resulting decline in the number of principals further increases
the optimal eﬀort the agent exerts for each principal, as can be seen from
the ﬁrst part of Proposition 1.
Noncontractibility of attention does not imply contract incompleteness,
in the sense that players’ obligations are vague or unspeciﬁed (Bernheim
and Whinston 1998). This is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If eﬀort is contractible and attention is not contractible,
then the ﬁrst-best can be achieved through an incentive contract that grants
autonomy of eﬀort choice to the agent, pays the agent the full marginal
product of her eﬀort for each principal, and that conditions each principal’s
contribution to the agent’s wage on the eﬀort provided for him.
The proof is given in the appendix. Since the ﬁrst-best can be achieved,
noncontractibility of attention neither aﬀects the players’ payoﬀs nor organi-
zational design. However, it has important consequences for contract design.
When both attention and eﬀort are contractible, a simple forcing contract —
stipulating the agent’s eﬀorts and the principals’ attention — is suﬃcient to
attain the ﬁrst-best. By contrast, with noncontractible attention, incentives
for the principals and for the agent need to be ﬁne-tuned. We discuss the
main features of the optimal contract for the agent and each principal in
turn.
First, the agent must be granted autonomy of eﬀort choice. Suppose the
agent’s contract would dictate her eﬀort level, as in the previous section.
Then, principals would have no incentive to give attention, since the agent’s
eﬀort would be unresponsive to social exchange. Anticipating this lack of
attention, the agent would then demand a higher wage for the same (or a
l o w e r )l e v e lo fe ﬀort.13
Second, to avoid underprovision of eﬀort, the organization cannot rely on
social exchange alone. To attain ﬁrst-best eﬀort, the agent must be oﬀered
incentive pay equal to the full marginal product of her eﬀort. We thus have
the standard result that, when both principals and agents are risk-neutral
in income, optimal bonus pay for the agent equals the full marginal product.
Third, principals must be rewarded by the organization for high perfor-
mance of the agent for them. Without bonus pay for principals, attention is
at a suboptimally low level. The intuition is simple: Since the agent receives
13A related argument is given by Bernheim and Whinston (1998) in the context of a
dynamic model without social exchange. They show that, when an employee’s eﬀort is
not fully contractible, the employer has an incentive to leave some of his (potentially
contractible) obligations ambiguous, so as to strengthen repeated game incentives.
10the full marginal product of her eﬀort, eﬀort translates into higher agent’s
pay rather than into a higher payoﬀ for the principals. Hence, principals
have no gain from increasing the agent’s eﬀort by giving attention. In order
to motivate principals to provide suﬃcient attention to the agent, they must
be given ﬁnancial incentives by the organization (the group of principals or
their superior). Even though attention cannot be directly rewarded, princi-
pals can be induced to give suﬃcient attention by making their contribution
to the wage costs dependent on the agent’s eﬀort for him. This way, ‘bad
management’ by principals is implicitly punished and ‘good management’
is implicitly rewarded. The optimal reward for principals is such that they
fully internalize the positive eﬀect of their attention on the agent’s payoﬀ.14
5 Incomplete contracts
When neither eﬀort nor attention are veriﬁable, the contract only stipulates
the number of principals the agent will work for and her base salary, which
is equally shared by the principals.15 Thus, the only way in which the ﬁrm’s
principals in stage one can provide incentives to the agents and themselves
is by altering the number of principals that shares an agent. As we will see,
sharing an agent with more principals strengthens the incentives for each
principal to give attention to the agent which, in turn, increases the agent’s
eﬀort. Hence, organizational design serves as the interface between ﬁrm’s
proﬁts and the actions of the ﬁrm’s principals and agents.
We solve the game by backward induction. In the third stage, the agent




0 ei)+Fe(ei,a i)=0for all i.( 4 )
Notice that, in general, we cannot say whether eﬀort is higher or lower than
in the ﬁrst-best case. While the agent has neither a contractual obligation
nor a ﬁnancial incentive to provide eﬀort, the principals may give more
attention or share the agent with fewer principals than in the ﬁrst-best
as substitutes for the lack of formal incentives. For later use, we derive
some comparative static results for the agent’s choice of eﬀort, which are
summarized in the following lemma.
14It is easy to verify that ﬁrst-best attention can also be achieved by a forcing contract
for the principals which punishes those principals for whom eﬀort deviates from the ﬁrst-
best. An advantage of the incentive contract derived in the Appendix is that it better
insulates principals from trembling hands of their colleagues, the agent, and themselves.
15We do not deal with the case where attention is contractible and eﬀort is not, because
we feel that in practice this is of limited importance.
11Lemma 1 If neither eﬀort nor attention are contractible, then:
1. for a given level of attention by each principal, eﬀort for each principal
decreases with the number of principals that share an agent (holding
ai constant, dei/dn < 0);
2. for a given number of principals that share an agent, attention by prin-
cipal i increases the agent’s eﬀort for principal i, decreases the agent’s
eﬀort for all other principals, and increases the agent’s total eﬀort
(holding n constant, dei/dai > 0, dej6=i/dai < 0,a n dd
R n
0 ei/dai > 0);
3. the eﬀect of principal i’s attention on the agent’s eﬀort for him in-
creases with the number of principals that share an agent (d(dei/dai)/dn >
0).
The proof is in the appendix, the intuition follows. First, for a given
level of attention, working for more principals reduces eﬀort for each prin-
cipal, because the accompanying increase in total eﬀort raises the agent’s
marginal cost of eﬀort for each principal. Second, when a principal gives
more attention to the agent, the agent feels a need to reciprocate and so
provides more eﬀort for him. As this raises her marginal cost of eﬀort, she
provides less eﬀort for the other principals. Hence, attention by a principal
imposes a negative externality on other principals. Third, the eﬀectiveness
at the margin of a principal’s attention in raising the agent’s eﬀort for him
increases with the number of principals. The intuition is as follows. When
a principal gives more attention, the agent reciprocates by increasing eﬀort
for that principal, which comes partly at the cost of increasing total eﬀort,
and partly at the cost of reducing eﬀort for the other principals. When the
agent works for more principals, the latter cost is lower, because a given re-
duction in eﬀort for the other principals can be spread over a larger number
of principals. This implies that the agent is more responsive to a principal’s
attention as the number of principals increases.
In the second stage principals independently choose their level of atten-
tion. The ﬁrst-order condition for optimal attention of principal i is:
dei
dai
Qe(ei) − Ha(ai)=0 . (5)
Each principal trades oﬀ the cost of giving attention and the beneﬁtt h a t
the agent exerts more eﬀort for him. Note the diﬀerence with attention in
the ﬁrst-best case described by Proposition 1: When eﬀort and attention are
noncontractible, the provision of attention depends on the responsiveness of
12the agent to attention and not on how valuable attention is to her. As we
will see, this may result in too high or too low attention compared to the
ﬁrst-best. Note also that each principal disregards the eﬀect of his attention
on the eﬀorts provided by the agent for the other principals. As Lemma 1
showed, if principal i gives more attention, the agent responds by increasing
eﬀort for principal i and decreasing eﬀort for the other (n − 1) principals.
This, in turn, induces these other principals to give more attention to the
agent as well, because the decrease in eﬀort makes additional eﬀorts more
valuable. In equilibrium, the negative externality that principals impose on
one another makes that each principal’s attention is above the level that is
in their joint interest during the second stage of the game.16
The following lemma describes the eﬀect on attention of the number of
principals that share an agent.
Lemma 2 If neither eﬀort nor attention are contractible, then an increase
in the number of principals that share an agent increases each principal’s
attention (dai/dn > 0).
The proof is in the appendix. Increasing the number of principals has
two eﬀects working in the same direction. First, for a given level of at-
tention, the agent exerts less eﬀort for each principal when the number of
principals increases. Since the marginal product of eﬀort is decreasing in ef-
fort, additional eﬀort becomes more valuable to each principal. Hence, each
principal increases attention so as to increase eﬀort for him. Second, when
the number of principals increases, the agent becomes more responsive to a
principal’s attention (as we have seen in Lemma 1), and so each principal
has a stronger incentive to provide attention.
Lastly, in the ﬁrst stage the principals decide on the number of principals
to share an agent with, taking into account the eﬀects on attention and eﬀort
we derived above as well as the eﬀect on the wage costs. As in the ﬁrst-best,
the wage costs are equally shared among the homogenous principals. The
following proposition describes the optimal number of principals that share
an agent when neither eﬀort nor attention are contractible and reiterates
the levels of eﬀort and attention that arise.




Qe(ei)+( n − 1)
dej6=i
dai
Qe(ej6=i) − Ha(ai)=0for all i.
13Proposition 3 If neither eﬀort nor attention are contractible, then:
1. the agent’s eﬀort is described by −Ce(
R n
0 ei)+Fe(ei,a i)=0for all i,
2. the principals’ attention is given by dei
daiQe(ei) − Ha(ai)=0for all i,
















[Ha(ai) − Fa(ei,a i)] = 0. (6)
The proof is in the appendix. As in the ﬁrst-best case described in Propo-
sition 1, the ﬁrst two terms in (6) show that principals strive to minimize
the costs of the agent’s services by setting the number of principals that
share an agent such that the agent’s average and marginal cost of eﬀort are
equal. Importantly, the level of n where the ﬁrst two terms in (6) are zero
need not coincide with the ﬁrst-best level of n. The reason is that the level
of eﬀort will generally be diﬀerent in the two cases, see the ﬁrst two parts
of Propositions 1 and 3. When eﬀort is lower than in the ﬁrst-best (because
the lack of ﬁnancial incentives is not made up for by increased attention),
principals have an incentive to share an agent with more principals than in
the ﬁrst-best case, because sharing an agent is less costly when the agent
provides lower eﬀort for each principal. When eﬀort is higher than in the
ﬁrst-best (when the attention race is severe, inducing high eﬀort for each
principal), the reverse is true: principals have an incentive to share an agent
with fewer principals.
The third term in (6) describes the eﬀect of the number of principals that
share an agent on the principal’s payoﬀ through its eﬀect on attention provi-
sion. Note that the terms in brackets sum to zero when both attention and
eﬀort are at their ﬁrst-best level. However, principals’ attention will likely
not match with the ﬁrst-best level because, as we have seen, the motives for
giving attention diﬀer between the two cases (compare the second parts of
Propositions 1 and 3). While in the ﬁrst-best case attention is set so as to
maximize the agent’s and principals’ joint surplus from attention provision,
in the case of noncontractibility, attention is chosen noncooperatively and
only given to evoke reciprocal feelings in the agent. If the resulting atten-
tion is low so that Fa exceeds Ha (e.g., because the agent values attention
a lot but the agent’s eﬀort is only weakly responsive to attention), then the
third term in (6) is positive and so principals have an incentive to increase
the number of principals that share an agent. By doing so, they make the
attention race more severe, which is a blessing, since it mitigates the princi-
pals’ underprovision of attention. Conversely, if attention is high so that Fa
14is lower than Ha (e.g. because the attention race is severe, while attention
is not valued much by the agent), the third term in (6) is negative and so
principals have an incentive to limit the number of principals that share an
agent so as to reduce wasteful attention provision.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has developed a model of social interaction in the workplace
between managers and workers. We have investigated the conditions un-
der which ineﬃcient social exchange in organizations can occur, and how
this may be avoided. We have used a common agency setting to allow for
multiple post-hiring loyalties in organizations on top of the formal employ-
ment contract. We think that such a setting captures the essences of life
in the modern ﬁrm, for many employees eﬀectively work to satisfy the de-
mands of more than one superior. On top of the examples of employees in
support departments mentioned in the introduction, we may add employ-
ees in matrix organizations (who report to a functional manager as well as
to a project manager), internal service managers (who provide an interface
between parts of the organization), and procurement managers (who coordi-
nate and communicate the requests of various branches of the organization
towards external suppliers). In addition, following the process of decentral-
ization of decision-making within ﬁrms, the recent phenomenon of setting
up shared service centers creates an environment in which supporting staﬀ
performs tasks for multiple business units.
We have shown that granting autonomy of eﬀort choice to employees can
make it easier for organizations to measure and reward the performance of
(middle) managers. When employees are easily motivated by these man-
agers, then the organization gets hold of a powerful set of motivational
practices. Further, we have seen that one should be cautious with shar-
ing human resources, for it results in rivalry among managers, absorbing
precious corporate energy. Rivalry among managers need not always be a
problem, however. When employees appreciate managerial support suﬃ-
ciently, the attention race is a blessing in disguise for it alleviates manager’s
moral hazard problem in attention provision.
In a broader interpretation of our model, attention giving may capture
the tools of management more generally. However, not all such tools qualify
under the heading of a in our paper. A key qualiﬁcation for tools to ﬁt
in our set-up is that the exchange between a manager and worker triggers
reciprocity in eﬀort mainly for that manager. For example, giving a worker
15a new and better ‘hammer’ (improving her self-esteem, her general work
ethic or motivation) will increase eﬀort for the providing manager, but also
for the other principals. Hence, if attention of a manager is a non-rivalrous
public good to the ﬁrm, the attention race will not occur, so that the most
interesting results of this paper disappear. As reciprocity is a private and in-
dividual feeling for a speciﬁc other, the analysis in this paper mainly applies
to the tools of management that trigger such individual reciprocal feelings.
Clearly, in a setting with a single principal the reciprocity term may well
capture all actions by the principal that reduce the worker’s cost of eﬀort.
A richer framework would allow managers to have reciprocal feelings and
to care for attention too. Unless attention and eﬀort are perfect substitutes,
this extension does not aﬀect our main results, for attention by the manager
will trigger both attention and eﬀort for him. Clearly, the more megalomanic
and attention-loving the manager is, the lower is the eﬀect of his attention on
worker’s eﬀort; a work-shy employee will simply reciprocate her manager’s
attention by telling him how good he is.
Lastly, introducing managers’ reciprocity allows for a simultaneous game
between the managers and the worker. This clearly is an important exten-
sion, as in practice there is a constant exchange of eﬀo r ta n da t t e n t i o ni nt h e
workplace, in which the timing of events plays a less prominent role than in
our set up. When individuals obtain a higher utility by living up to others’
expectations and this is correctly anticipated by the other players, we feel
conﬁdent that the results of our paper qualitatively apply. Intuitively, when
the worker feels good when providing high eﬀort for a manager who gives
high attention, and likewise for managers, an equilibrium arises in which an
attention race in reciprocal exchanges forces a rethinking of organizational
design.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
With veriﬁable eﬀort and attention, principals design a forcing contract,
specifying both the eﬀort exerted by the agent for each principal, and the
attention given by each principal to the agent. Since principals are homoge-
nous and we have decreasing returns to scale in production and convex cost
of eﬀort and attention, we can safely assume that the ﬁrst-best contract has
eﬀort and attention being the same for all principals,17 and that the wage
17Alternatively, we can proceed in two steps. First, for a given n, determine the jointly
optimal levels of ei and ai for all i,w h e r eei and ai a r ea l l o w e dt ob ed i ﬀerent across





Using this and the principal’s payoﬀ function (1), the ﬁrst-best optimal levels
of eﬀort, attention, and number of principals who share an agent solve:
max











where ai and ei are restricted to be the same for all i and the term in brackets
is the agent’s wage which follows from the agent’s participation constraint
(3). The ﬁrst-order conditions are:
Qe(ei) − Ce(
R n
0 ei)+Fe(ei,a i)=0for all i, (A1)
















0 ei) − F(ei,a i)
¤
=0 . (A3)
The conditions (A1) and (A2) are identical to those in the ﬁrst and second
part of Proposition 1. Since optimal eﬀort and attention are the same for











which is identical to the condition in the third part of Proposition 1.¤
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y1
For convenience, we introduce a weight, γ,o nt h et e r m
R n
0 F(ei,a i) in the
agent’s utility function (2). Diﬀerentiating the adapted ﬁrst-order conditions
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principals. By our assumptions about the shape of the functions Q, H,a n dF,w eﬁnd
that optimal ei and ai are the same for all i. Second, using these results, determine the
optimal n from the perspective of an individual principal. The results are the same.
17where we have suppressed the arguments of all functions for brevity, and
the denominator of dei/dγ is negative by the second-order conditions.¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
We prove the proposition by backward induction, and so start with the
agent’s eﬀort choice in stage 3 of the game. Let the agent’s wage consist of
a base salary, w,a n das e to fn b o n u s e sw i t he a c hb o n u sb(ei) depending on
the eﬀort for one of the principals involved in the contract. The ﬁrst-order
conditions for the agent’s optimal eﬀorts then are:
be(ei) − Ce(
R n
0 ei)+Fe(ei,a i)=0for all i. (A5)
C o m p a r i n gt ot h eﬁrst-best level of eﬀort as described in Proposition 1, it
follows that if the agent is shared by the ﬁrst-best number of principals and
principals have given the ﬁrst-best level of attention in the second stage of
the game, then be(ei)=Qe(ei) for all ei (that is, paying the agent the full
marginal product of her eﬀort for each principal) ensures that the agent
provides ﬁrst-best eﬀort for all principals.
Next consider the principals’ choice of attention in the second stage of the
game. Let each principal’s contribution to the agent’s wage costs depend on
the eﬀort provided for him and take the following form: s(ei)=b(ei)+t(ei).
Thus, each principal covers the agent’s bonus pay arising from the agent’s
eﬀort for him and makes an additional contribution to or receives a discount
from the organization, t(ei), which also depends on the agent’s eﬀort for
him. The ﬁrst-order condition for principal i’s optimal attention then is:
dei
dai
[Qe(ei) − be(ei) − te(ei)] − Ha(ai)=0 , (A6)





−Fea [bee + Fee − (n − 1)Cee]
(bee + Fee)
2 − nCee (bee + Fee)
> 0, (A7)
where the sign follows from our assumptions about the functions F and C
a sd e s c r i b e di nS e c t i o n3a n df r o mbee = Qee < 0, which is implied by the
result that the agent receives the full marginal product of eﬀort, as shown
18Note that (A5) represents n ﬁrst-order conditions describing optimal eﬀort for all n
principals. Expression (A7) follows from diﬀerentiating all these ﬁrst-order conditions to
ai, ei,a n da l lej6=i,a n dt h e nc o m b i n i n gt h e ms oa st oe n du pw i t ha ne x p r e s s i o nf o r
dei/dai. Since the third derivatives of all functions are assumed to be negligibly small, we
have suppressed the arguments of all functions in (A7).
18in the previous step of this proof. Equation (A7) shows that when the
agent is reciprocal, the agent exerts more eﬀort for a principal when the
principal has given more attention (that is, if Fea > 0,t h e ndei/dai > 0).
This positive eﬀect of attention on eﬀort can give principals an incentive
to provide attention, as described by ﬁrst-order condition (A6). Note that,
since the agent receives her full marginal product (be(ei)=Qe(ei)), the ﬁrst
two terms in square brackets in (A6) cancel out. In order to induce the
ﬁrst-best level of attention, the principals need to be incentivized through
the other part of the contribution scheme, t(ei). Comparing (A6) to the
condition for ﬁrst-best attention as described in Proposition 1, and denoting








for all ei, then each principal has an incentive to provide the ﬁrst-best level
of attention.19 Since dei/dai > 0 and Fa > 0,t h eo p t i m a lte is negative
and so each principal receives a discount on his contribution to wage costs,
which increases with the eﬀort provided for him.
Lastly, because ﬁrst-best eﬀort and ﬁrst-best attention can be sustained
through the incentive contract, the optimal number of principals that share
an agent is also equal to its ﬁrst-best level. The base salary of the agent is
such that her participation constraint binds:




0 F(e∗,a ∗) − nb(e∗),
and the lump-sum part of the principals’ contributions must be such that
their budget constraint binds:
ns(e∗)=nb(e∗)+nt(e∗)=w + nb(e∗) ⇒ nt(e∗)=w.
¤
P r o o fo fL e m m a1
Note that (4) represents n ﬁrst-order conditions describing optimal eﬀort
for all n principals. Applying the implicit function theorem gives:












































where the signs follow from our assumptions about the functions F and C
a sd e s c r i b e di nS e c t i o n3 . ¤
P r o o fo fL e m m a2
Applying the implicit function theorem to (5), while treating ei as an
endogenous variable and noting that dei/dai depends on n but not on any
of the other endogenous variables (see the proof of Lemma 1 and recall that




























P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
The proofs to the ﬁrst and second part of Proposition 3 are given in the
main text preceding the proposition. The third part describes the optimal
number of principals that share an agent, which follows from:
max




















































20Using the ﬁrst-order conditions (4) and (5) and noting that ai and ei are
identical for all i, the condition can be simpliﬁed to the expression in Propo-
sition 3.¤
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